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ABSTRACT
We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is
chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in amajority-rule
election, and the winner then selects a policy from amultidimensional policy space.
Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are
publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in “simple”
voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible
equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience
and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify
relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying vot-
ing game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives
may lead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding
commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbency
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advantage. Finally, we give an asymptotic version of the median voter theorem for
the one-dimensional model as voters become-arbitrarily patient.
Elections occupy a central position in the determination of public policies in represen-
tative democracies. By selecting the individuals whose subsequent decisions determine
final policy outcomes, elections resolve conflicts among competing majorities, and trans-
form the preferences of voters into collective choices. It is well-known that, when the
policy space is one-dimensional and voters have single-peaked preferences, a single pol-
icy outcome, the ideal point of themedian voter, is majority-preferred to all others. In the
canonical model of Downs (1957), in which two candidates commit to policy platforms
before a single election, this drives the candidates to themedian and yields a uniqueNash
equilibrium of the electoral game. When the policy space is multidimensional, however,
majority undominated (or “core”) points rarely exist, and in the absence of a core point,
the entire space of policy alternatives will be contained in a majority preference cycle,
suggesting to some authors (e.g., Riker 1980) the instability of policies over time. In
contrast to that literature, where coalitions are assumed to form fluidly irrespective of
institutional constraints, we explicitly model electoral institutions and the incentives of
voters and politicians, creating the potential to restrict the formation of coalitions and
limit the potential instability of collective choices.
In this paper, we consider an infinite-horizon model of electoral accountability in
which a representative is elected in every period and chooses a policy from amultidimen-
sional space. As in the citizen–candidate literature, we view campaign promises as cheap
talk (and therefore omit them from the model), and elected representatives choose policy
unconstrained by past commitments. We consider farsighted and rational voters, who
must calculate expected streams of payoffs conditional on all available information to
vote for their preferred candidates, and we assume that elected representatives similarly
anticipate the future consequences of policies and choose optimally. The challenge in
proving existence of equilibrium, in contrast to the Downsian model where candidates
compete for majority support, lies in resolving these decision problems simultaneously.
In contrast to the usual result in citizen–candidate models, where elected officials sim-
ply choose their ideal policies, we find that under quite general conditions, some (even
all) types of representative optimize by choosing a suitable compromise, balancing their
interest in a desirable policy in the current period with concerns for re-election in the
future. Thus, we provide a theory of endogenous compromise by elected representa-
tives, relying on asymmetric information and repetition, rather than on the Downsian
assumption of commitment.
Our framework is general with respect to the policy space and voter preferences: we
allow policies to lie in a subset of any finite-dimensional Euclidean space, and borrowing
weak assumptions from the spatial modeling literature, we assume that voter utilities
are continuous and strictly quasi-concave. In each period, a challenger is drawn from
the electorate to run against the incumbent in a majority-rule election, with the winner
choosing the policy for that period. The process then moves to the next period, and the
above sequence of events is repeated ad infinitum. Voters observe the policies chosen by
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the representatives but not their preferences. Thus, incomplete information in the form
of adverse selection is present, and elections confront voters with a non-trivial problem:
they must update their beliefs about the incumbent based on her past policy choices and
compare this to the expectedpolicy outcomesupon electing a challenger.Representatives,
being chosen from the electorate at large, have well-defined policy preferences of their
own and face a trade-off in choice of policy: they have short-term incentives to choose
policies in their personal interest, but they have long-term interests in staying in office
to capture “non-policy” benefits of office and to obtain better policy outcomes than
expected from a challenger. The key to this trade-off, and the role of private information
in the model, is that pursuit of short-term policy interests may reveal information to
voters that damages the representative’s chances of re-election.
We prove the existence of “simple” equilibria in which voters use strategies that are
retrospective (Fiorina 1981) in the following sense: an individual votes for re-election if
and only if her utility in the previous period was at or above a fixed critical level, this
level being determined endogenously as the expected value of an untried challenger.
Thus, voters are also prospective in that they vote as though pivotal in the current
election, reconciling the usual notions of retrospective andprospective voting. Because an
untried challenger is inherently risky and voters are risk averse, an elected representative
has a degree of leverage in choosing policies to achieve re-election, creating a form of
incumbency advantage in equilibrium: an elected representative may be able to obtain
a satisfactory policy outcome and win re-election by placating a majority of voters.
We show through a series of examples that a wide variety of policy and re-election
patterns can emerge in equilibrium, particularly in multiple dimensions. It is possible
that no representative is ever re-elected, each choosing her ideal policy while in office
and failing to gain the support of a majority of voters. With different parameter values,
it is possible that all types of representative receive majority support. In such examples,
some representatives may choose a compromise policy sufficient to ensure re-election
but not too far from her ideal, or it may be that all representatives can win by simply
choosing their ideal policies.
The dynamics of our model are relatively simple. In order to bring out the logic of
equilibrium, which must resolve the expectations of voters and optimal policy choices
of representatives, we assume a stationary environment. This allows us to focus on the
class of simple equilibria in which voters use a fixed cut-off, described above, and the
policy choices of representatives are history-independent. Thus, in case all types are
re-elected in equilibrium, the first individual to hold office will remain there, choosing
the same policy in every period, demonstrating that an extreme form of “policy
persistence” can occur in the model. We interpret the extent of policy persistence as a
measure of incumbency advantage in the model and as indicative of stability of policy
outcomes were to introduce an element of noise in the environment.1 We prove that if
non-policy benefits of holding office are sufficiently high or individuals are sufficiently
1 As we remark in section “Extensions,” our results, suitably adapted, would go through even if we
added an exogenous and time-invariant probability of removal from office. This would complicate
the dynamics of the model but would not affect the spirit of our findings.
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patient (and non-policy benefits are positive), then all simple equilibria exhibit such
policy persistence. Patience on the part of the voters and representatives can produce
this stability in any number of policy dimensions, even in the absence of a core point. If
non-policy benefits are zero, then it turns out that patience leads to policy persistence
unless there is a core point: the presence of a core point can actually be a destabilizing
force. Even then, however, we are able to show that the set of policies acceptable to a
majority of voters collapses to the core as patience increases. When patience is great
enough, therefore, either policy persistence obtains, or the long run distribution of
policies is concentrated arbitrarily close to the core.
We then characterize simple equilibria in connection to the core, and for the one-
dimensional special case, we provide a game-theoretic foundation for the median voter
theorem. It is known that the Downsian result of convergence at the median fails when
the commitment assumption is dropped in the standard, one-shot model of elections.
Our results establish that if we imbed the Downsian model in a more realistic framework
that explicitly models repeated elections and incorporates private information about
policy preferences, we in fact re-obtain the median voter result. We show it is possible
that all representatives choose the same policy in equilibrium, a phenomenon we call
“policy coincidence,” only if non-policy office benefits are sufficiently high, individuals
are sufficiently patient, and a core point exists. In that case, all representatives must
choose the core point, and we say that the equilibrium exhibits “core equivalence.”
In one dimension, the core is always non-empty and consists of the median voter’s
ideal point, and we can show that if there are sufficient benefits of office (with positive
discount factors) or sufficient patience (with positive non-policy benefits), then there is
a unique simple equilibrium. In it, all representatives choose the median, giving us full
core equivalence. If holding office confers no non-policy benefit, then core equivalence
need not obtain, but we show that, as voters become more patient, the set of policies that
ensure re-election, and the long run distribution of equilibrium policies along with it,
still collapse to the median.
In multiple dimensions, where the core is typically empty, it follows from above that
policy coincidence will be the exception. Thus, in equilibrium, some representatives
choose distinct policies. Then, when voters are sufficiently patient or non-policy benefits
of office are sufficiently high, our policy persistence result implies that multiple poli-
cies can be sustained in equilibrium. Such a conclusion comes not from a multiplicity
of equilibria, but rather from the possibility that representatives with different policy
preferences have the willingness and ability to attract and maintain different majority
coalitions within a single equilibrium. In this way, when the policy space is multidimen-
sional, two electorates with identical voter preferences can be associated with distinct
stable policies.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Most analyses of elections follow theDownsian tradition in highlighting the pre-election
campaign aspects of the competition for the role as representative. In the basic model,
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each of two otherwise identical candidates simultaneously announces a policy to be imple-
mented if elected, with voters then casting their ballots for the candidate offering the
preferred policy. While originally presented by Downs as a model of a single election in
a one-dimensional policy space with office-motivated candidates and complete informa-
tion, subsequent research has analyzed repeated elections, policy-motivated candidates,
and probabilistic voting. All of this work, however, has retained the important underlying
assumption of the Downsian model that the winning candidate will faithfully carry out
her announced policy. This commitment assumption is often rationalized on the grounds
that if a candidate broke a campaign promise, then there would be some (unmodelled)
electoral punishments inflicted in the future. This maneuver effectively “black boxes” a
principle component of the public policy process, namely, why representatives behave as
they do while in office. An alternative approach is to drop the commitment assumption
and model political candidates as citizens, with policy preferences of their own (Osborne
and Slivinski 1996, Besley and Coate 1997). But in the citizen–candidate literature, the
focus is on one-shot elections, and voters have complete information about candidate
preferences. As a consequence, an elected official simply chooses her ideal policy in every
period.
A third approach, beginning with the work of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) and
sometimes referred to as models of “electoral accountability,” drops commitment in
the context of repeated elections. In contrast to the Downsian model, voters base their
decisions on the past performance of incumbents, rather than their current promises. In
selecting policies, representatives typically care not only about winning, but also about
their actions while in office, either through their own policy preferences or else in terms
of the “effort” expended on their constituents’ behalf. With the exception of Barro
(1973), electoral accountability models assume some form of incomplete information
is present: either the motivations of the representatives are known but their influence
over policy, and hence over voter utility, is not (Ferejohn 1986, Austen-Smith and Banks
1989), or their influence over policy is known but their motivations are not (Reed 1994,
Duggan 2000, Bernhardt et al. 2004,Meirowitz 2007), or neither is known (Rogoff 1990,
Banks and Sundaram 1993, 1998, Coate and Morris 1995, Fearon 1999). To date, all of
this work has maintained the original Downsian assumption of a unidimensional policy
space, conceptualized either as a space of effort levels or as an ideological dimension. In
fact, many of these models are further simplified by the assumption that there is just one
voter.
Of the papers in the electoral accountability literature, the structure of our model is
most similar to that of Duggan (2000), with the key differences being that the latter
assumes a one-dimensional policy space, “tent-shaped” Euclidean distance utilities, and
symmetry of the distribution of challenger ideal points.The existence of simple equilibria
is proved, and it is shown that in all such equilibria, the median voter is decisive: a policy
choice by an officeholder secures re-election if and only if it gives the median voter a
payoff at least equal to the median’s expected payoff from electing a challenger. This
model has been extended to allow for term limits (Bernhardt et al. 2004), for parties
(Bernhardt et al. 2005, Campuzano 2005), and for costly signaling in campaigns (Kang
2005).
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Before proceeding, we mention several papers on dynamic elections that are oth-
erwise dissimilar to ours. Duggan and Fey (2006) imbed the Downsian model with
office-motivated candidates within an infinite-horizon model of repeated elections and
show that under weak conditions on discount factors, arbitrary paths of policies can
be supported in equilibrium using various constructions. Alesina (1988) assumes a
one-dimensional policy space in a repeated elections setting, but in a two-candidate,
simultaneous-move model without commitment. The preferences of the candidates are
known to the voters, and include both policy and non-policy components. He shows
that, when discount factors are high enough, a range of policy outcomes can be sustained
in equilibrium when voters and candidates employ trigger strategies of a certain form.
Kramer (1977) studies a two-candidate model of repeated elections in multiple dimen-
sions such that in any period, the challengermay commit to a policy, while the incumbent
is bound to her previous policy choice. Challengers maximize their margin of victory,
and politicians and voters are myopic. He shows that, when voters have Euclidean pref-
erences, equilibrium policies converge to the “minmax” set, a set that coincides with the
core when the latter is non-empty.
Finally, the working paper version of this paper (Banks and Duggan 2001, 2008)
contains several results removed from this economized version and a discussion of the
connections between our equilibrium concept and that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
THE ELECTORALMODEL
LetX ⊂ d denote a compact and convex set of policies, letN = [0, 1]be a continuumof
individuals, and let the possible preferences of voters be indexed by a finite setT of types,
denoted t. Each individual i’s type ti is drawn from the distribution ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρ|T |),
whereρt is the probability of type t. To preclude trivial instances of themodel, we assume
that are at least two types and each type has positive probability, i.e., |T | ≥ 2 and ρt > 0
for all t ∈ T . We extend the idea of independent types to the current model as follows:
the distribution of an individual’s type, conditional on the types of any finite number of
other individuals, remains ρ. We assume that the law of large numbers holds, so that,
with probability one, the fraction of type t individuals is ρt for all t ∈ T .2 Any one
individual’s type is private information, but the distribution ρ is common knowledge.
The preferences of type t individuals are represented by a utility function ut on X ,
assumed to be continuous, concave, and strictly quasi-concave. We normalize payoffs so
that ut(x) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T and all x ∈ X . Let xt = arg max{ut(x) : x ∈ X} denote
the unique ideal policy for type t individuals. Assume that ideal policies are distinct, i.e.,
xt = xt′ for all t, t′ ∈ T , and note that, by strict quasi-concavity, ut(xt) > 0 for all t ∈ T .
2 We also assume that, for each type t, the set {i ∈ N : ti = t} is Lebesguemeasurable with probability
one. Judd (1985) establishes the existence of a joint distribution of voter types for which these
conditions are satisfied for almost all realizations of voter types. See Banks and Duggan (2006) for
rigorous foundations of this model.
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Of interest later is the weighted majority voting game among the types in T , with
weights given by the proportions (ρ1, . . . , ρ|T |) of types present in the electorate. Let
D =
{
C ⊆ T :
∑
t∈C
ρt > 1/2
}
denote the decisive coalitions of types. We impose the condition that there is no coalition
of types C ⊂ T such that∑t∈C ρt = 1/2, i.e., no coalition of types has precisely half
of the population. This implies that the voting game is strong, in the following sense:
for all C ⊆ T , either C ∈ D or T \C ∈ D. The core is the set, K , of policies that are
undominated in this voting game, i.e.,
K =
{
x ∈ X : there do not exist y ∈ X and C ∈ Dsuch that, for all t ∈ C, ut(y) > ut(x)
}
.
Because X is convex and utility functions are strictly quasi-concave, it follows that K ,
if non-empty, will be a singleton. Denote this core policy by xc. In addition, the core
satisfies the following external stability condition: for all y = xc, {t ∈ T : ut (xc) >
ut (y)} ∈ D. It is known that, because D is strong, the core is typically empty when X
is multidimensional, but in one dimension, the core is always non-empty and is equal
to the ideal policy of the weighted median type. Defining m as the unique element of T
satisfying
{t ∈ T : xt ≤ xm} ∈ D and {t ∈ T : xt ≥ xm} ∈ D,
we therefore have xc = xm.
Elections proceed as follows. In period 1, an individual is randomly chosen as repre-
sentative and selects a policy in X . In each period τ = 2, 3, . . . , an individual is selected
as representative as follows. A challenger is randomly drawn from a density on N to run
against the incumbent, the representative from period τ − 1. Let γ = (γ1, . . . , γ|T |)
denote the distribution of challenger types, where γt > 0 for all t ∈ T . We do not
assume that the distribution of challenger types mirrors the distribution of types in the
electorate. Individuals observe the “name” of the challenger, but not her type. Once the
challenger is determined, each individual casts a vote in {In,Ch}, where In denotes a vote
for the incumbent andCh a vote for the challenger. If the proportion of individuals voting
for the incumbent is at least one half, then the incumbent wins the election and becomes
the period τ representative. Otherwise, the challenger wins. The period τ representative
selects any policy in X , this selection is observed by the voters, and the game moves
to the next period, where this process is repeated. Note that because the challenger is
drawn from N according to a density, the probability any given individual is chosen to
run as challenger in any given period is zero.
A public history of length τ, denoted hτ , describes the publicly observed events in
the first τ periods, namely, the individuals chosen as representatives, those chosen as
challengers, vote tallies from elections, and policies selected by winners. An infinite
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public history, h∞, is an infinite sequence of these variables. In particular, let {iτ} denote
the corresponding sequence of representatives and {xτ} the sequence of policies. An
individual i’s payoff from an infinite public history h∞ is then defined as
(1 − δ)
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1[uti (xτ) + ωi(iτ)β],
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is a common discount factor, β ≥ 0 is a common non-policy benefit
from being representative, and ωi is the indicator function on N taking on the value of
one if i = iτ and zero otherwise.
A strategy for i ∈ N describes, for each time period τ, a vote vτi ∈ {In,Ch} and
a policy pτi ∈ X if selected as representative, both functions of the public history of
length τ − 1. Because types are private information, we follow Harsanyi (1967–1968) in
modeling votes and policy choices as also depending on an individual’s type. We focus
on equilibria in which the individuals’ strategies are especially simple. First, individuals
employ retrospective voting rules: for all i ∈ N , there exists (measurable) ui : T → 
such that for all t ∈ T , all τ ≥ 1, and all hτ−1,
vτi (h
τ−1, t) = In if and only if ut(xτ−1) ≥ ui(t).
That is, i votes to retain the incumbent if and only if the incumbent’s most recent policy
choice satisfied the utility standard, or “cut-off,” ui(t). This cut-off is time-invariant,
consistent with a “What have you done for me lately?” attitude on the part of the voters.
Second, individuals’ policy choices are history-independent: for all i ∈ N , there exists
pi : T → X such that for all t ∈ T , all τ ≥ 1, and all hτ−1,
pτi (h
τ−1, t) = pi (t).
Thus, i chooses the same policy any time she is elected as representative. Note that these
two requirements are mutually re-enforcing: if voter strategies depend on history only
through the incumbent’s last chosen policy, then an incumbent’s policy decision problem
looks the same in all periods she is selected. Hence, if an individual has an optimal
policy strategy, then she necessarily has an optimal strategy that is history-independent.
Similarly, if representatives adopt history-independent policies, then knowledge of the
last policy chosen by an individual is sufficient for a voter to accurately predict that
individual’s policy choices in all future periods.
To resolve equilibrium existence issues, however, we must complicate our description
of policy choice strategies by allowing for “mixing” by representatives, i.e., the arbitrary
choice of policies over which the representative is indifferent, in the first term of office.
To preserve the idea of history-independence, we look for equilibria in which, after that
initial policy choice, the individual then chooses the same policy in every subsequent
term of office. In general, we represent mixing over policies of a representative i, newly
elected in period τ, as a Borel probability measure πτi , which again is a function of
public history and i’s type. Let P(X) denote the set of Borel probability measures on
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X , endowed with the topology of weak convergence.3 We focus on simple equilibria in
which policy choices by individual i, newly elected in period τ, can be described by a
(measurable) mapping πi : T → P(X) such that, for all t ∈ T , all τ ≥ 1, and all hτ−1,
πτi (h
τ−1, t) = πi(t).
Here, πi(t)(Y ) is the probability that type t of individual i initially chooses a policy in the
(measurable) subset Y ⊆ X , that policy being chosen by i whenever she is re-elected.
A simple strategy for i consists of a pair σi = (πi , ui). A simple strategy profile, denoted
σ = (πi , ui)i∈N , specifies a simple strategy for every individual with the added restriction
of type-symmetry: ui(t) = uj(t) and πi(t) = πj(t) for all i, j ∈ N and all t ∈ T . Note that
this is a “within-type” symmetry condition, and does not restrict policy choices across
different types of an individual. Abusing notation slightly, let ut denote the cut-off and
πt the mixed policy choice strategy used by all type t voters.We will also use the notation
π = (π1, . . . ,π|T |) for a profile of mixed policy choice strategies.
Each strategy profile σ induces a probability distribution over infinite histories from
the beginning of the game (prior to selecting the first representative) and, with it, an
expected utility vi(σ, t) for every i ∈ N and t ∈ T .4 Because challengers are drawn from
a density onN , in almost all histories a challenger will not have held office previously. By
our independence assumption, therefore, the voters’ beliefs about a challenger’s type are
given by ρ after almost all histories. By our restriction to simple strategies, then, vi(σ, t) is
also i’s expected utility, or continuation value, of replacing the current incumbent with an
untried challenger, after almost every history.5 Further, because individuals of the same
type, say t, have a common per-period utility function, a common discount factor, and
common beliefs about challengers, they will have the same continuation value, which we
henceforth express as vt(σ). Informally, a simple strategy profile σ∗ constitutes a simple
equilibrium if for all t ∈ T , π∗t is a “best response” whenever a type t representative
makes a policy choice and u∗t is a “best response” in every vote.
SIMPLE EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we give conditions on a simple strategy profile σ formalizing the idea that
voting and policy choice strategies are best responses for all individuals. Our optimality
condition on voting strategies is, essentially, that individuals decide to retain or replace
the current incumbent based on which candidate offers the higher payoff. That is,
3 A sequence {πn} of probability measures onX weakly converges to a probability measure π if, for all
(bounded) continuous functions f : X → , we have ∫ fdπn → ∫ fdπ. Because the policy spaceX
is a compact metric space, the set P(X) will be compact in this topology. See Aliprantis and Border
(1994, Theorem 12.10).
4 See Banks and Duggan (2006) for an explicit construction of this distribution.
5 We do not consider the probability zero set of histories in which a challenger has previously held
office. After such histories, continuation values would be defined to reflect updating based on all
relevant information.
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voters act as though “pivotal” in the current election, voting for the incumbent if the
expected utility from re-electing her is at least as great as the expected utility from
electing an untried challenger. The latter, for a type t of individual i, is simply vt (σ).
As for retaining the incumbent, suppose x ∈ X is the incumbent’s policy choice in the
previous period. Because individuals are adopting history-independent policy choice
strategies, the incumbent will continue to select x in the current period if retained. If σ
determines that the incumbent subsequently be replaced, then the expected utility to i
from retaining the current incumbent is (1 − δ) ut (x) + δvt (σ), which is greater than
vt(σ) if and only if ut (x) is greater than vt (σ). If σ determines that the incumbent be
forever retained, then the expected utility to i from retaining the current incumbent is
simply ut(x), and so again retaining the incumbent is preferred by i if and only if ut(x)
is greater than vt (σ). Thus, the cut-off ut = vt (σ) captures the decision of a pivotal
voter.6 Our best response condition for voting strategies is therefore that, for all t ∈ T,
ut = vt(σ).
Note that, while we have described the voters’ strategies as “retrospective” because
votes are determined by simple cut-off rules, they are actually “prospective” as well in
equilibrium: an individual votes for an incumbent only when retaining the incumbent
generates a higher expected future payoff than that generated by replacing her.
Given that individuals of the same type adopt common cut-off rules and that ρt is the
actual proportion of type t voters, the voting stage, from the perspective of the candidates,
is simply a weighted voting game among the types in T , with decisive coalitionsD. This
simplifies the statement of the best response condition on the policy strategies, because
an incumbent is retained if and only if the set of types voting for the incumbent is in D.
For each t ∈ T , let
At(σ) = {x ∈ X : ut(x) ≥ ut}
denote the acceptance set for type t individuals, i.e., those policies satisfying the cut-off
ut and inducing all type t individuals to vote for the incumbent. By the compactness and
convexity of X and the continuity and concavity of ut , this set is compact and convex.
For each coalition C ⊆ T of types, define the set
AC(σ) =
⋂
t∈C
At(σ)
of those policies inducing all types t ∈ C to vote for the incumbent. As the intersection
of compact and convex sets, AC(σ) is compact and convex as well. Finally, define
A(σ) =
⋃
C∈D
AC(σ)
6 Strictly speaking, the prediction of x here is justified by Bayesian updating about the incumbent’s
type only following histories consistent with σ. See Banks and Duggan (2008) for a detailed discus-
sion of these issues.
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as those policies that receive majority support and will, therefore, lead to re-election
of the incumbent. This social acceptance set is compact but not necessarily convex (see
Example 2).
Suppressing for the moment the dependence of the set A on the profile σ, the choice
for the type t of individual i when selected as representative is to either select a policy
x ∈ A (if non-empty), in which case she is retained for the next period, or select a
policy x /∈ A and subsequently be replaced. Choosing any x = xt from outside of A is
dominated by simply choosing xt . Additionally, when xt ∈ A, then she will optimally
select this as her policy in all periods and remain as incumbent forever. Otherwise, i.e.,
when xt /∈ A, the representative faces a trade-off: select xt in the current period and
be replaced or choose a ut-maximizing policy from A and be retained. The payoff from
choosing xt /∈ A is equal to
(1 − δ) [ut (xt) + β] + δvt (σ),
reflecting the one-time payoff from the representative’s ideal point, followed by the
continuation value of an untried challenger thereafter. Further, if choosing from A is
optimal in the current period, then it will remain so in all future periods, and any ut-
maximizing policy from A will remain ut-maximal in all future periods. Let
Mt(A) = arg max {ut(x) : x ∈ A}
denote the set of best socially acceptable policies for a type t individual. Our best response
condition for policy choice strategies is therefore that for all t ∈ T, (i) when a type t represen-
tative prefers to remain in office, i.e.,
sup{ut(x) : x ∈ A} + β > (1 − δ)[ut(xt) + β] + δvt(σ),
she choose from the best policies that ensure re-election, i.e., πt(Mt(A)) = 1, (ii) when the
inequality is reversed,πt({xt}) = 1 (and the representative is replaced in the next period), and
(iii) when equality holds, πt(Mt(A) ∪ {xt}) = 1. This completes our definition of simple
equilibrium.
The forgoing shows how representatives, themselves members of the electorate, take
into consideration the future policy consequences — even after being removed from
office — of their current policy decisions. By choosing her best available policy from
the social acceptance set A, a representative can guarantee that this policy remains in
effect forever. Alternatively, she can choose from outside of A, with the future policy
consequences of such an act summarized by σ. Which of these two options is preferred
then depends on the location of her best policy in A relative to her ideal policy (i.e.,
her best policy in X) and her continuation value, as well as the value of future policies
relative to those of the present (represented by the discount factor δ) and the non-policy
benefits of remaining in office (given by β).
Given a simple strategy profile σ, a type t individual’s continuation value satisfies
vt(σ) =
∑
t′∈T
γt′
[
[1 − πt′ (A(σ))][(1 − δ)ut(xt′ ) + δvt(σ)] +
∫
A(σ)
ut(x)πt′ (dx)
]
.
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The first term in the brackets is the probability that the current representative chooses
from outside A(σ) multiplied by t’s expected payoff in that case, which is simply one
period of the representative’s ideal policy followed by her removal and subsequently
“starting over.” The second (integral) term gives t’s expected payoff if the current
representative selects from A(σ), in which case, by history-independence, the latter
will make the same decision and be re-elected in all future periods. Manipulating this
equation to get an explicit solution, we have
vt(σ) =
∑
t′∈T γt′
[[1 − πt′ (A(σ))](1 − δ)ut(xt′ ) + ∫A(σ) ut(x)πt′ (dx)]
1 − δ∑t′∈T γt′ [1 − πt′ (A(σ))] ,
which is a convex combination of the one-period payoffs to t conditional on rep-
resentatives choosing from outside A(σ) (i.e., ut(xt′ )) and from inside A(σ) (i.e.,∫
A(σ) ut(x)πt′ (dx)/πt′ (A(σ))). Thus, vt(σ) can be written as the expectation of ut with
respect to a probability distribution overX , where elements inX\A(σ) receive relatively
less weight (by a factor of 1 − δ) as these policies are “temporary,” whereas policies in
A(σ) are “permanent.”7 Now define
x(σ) =
∑
t′∈T γt′
[[1 − πt′ (A(σ))](1 − δ)xt′ + ∫A(σ) xπt′ (dx)]
1 − δ∑t′∈T γt′ [1 − πt′ (A(σ))] ,
which is a similarly weighted average of equilibrium policies. Thus, x(σ) is the expected
outcome associated with the probability distribution over X induced by σ. Concavity
implies ut(x(σ)) ≥ vt(σ) for all t ∈ T , and by strict quasi-concavity and our assumption
that γt′ > 0 for all t′ ∈ T , this inequality strict unless all individuals of all types choose
the same policy when in office. Therefore, x(σ) ∈ At(σ) for all t ∈ T whenever σ
satisfies the best response condition for voters, and so the set A(σ) of policies that lead
to re-election will always include at least x(σ) and will, therefore, be non-empty.
We note, further, that if the core is non-empty, soK = {xc}, then xc ∈ A(σ) whenever
σ satisfies the best response condition for voters because x(σ) ∈ At(σ) for all t ∈ T (as
just argued) and ut(xc) ≥ ut(x(σ)) for a weighted majority of types (by external stability),
we therefore have ut(xc) ≥ ut(x(σ)) ≥ vt(σ), implying xc ∈At(σ), for a weightedmajority
of types. Thus, the core policy xc, whenever it exists, is an acceptable policy in every
equilibrium. An implication, of course, is that in one dimension, the ideal point of the
weighted median type is always sufficient to ensure re-election in a simple equilibrium.
In equilibrium, because the social acceptance set is non-empty, there will always exist
policies representatives could choose to ensure re-election. The question is whether they
7 Formally, we define the “continuation distribution” of σ, denoted ψ, as follows: for measurable
Y ⊆ X ,
ψ(Y ) =
∑
t∈T γt[(1 − πt(A))(1 − δ)µxt (Y ) + πt(Y ∩ A)]
1 − δ∑t∈T γt(1 − πt(A)) ,
where µxt is the point mass on xt .
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find it optimal to do so. With this in mind, given a simple equilibrium σ∗, partition the
set T of types into three subsets, W (“winners”), L (“losers”), and C (“compromisers”)
as follows:
W (σ∗) = {t ∈ T : xt ∈ A(σ∗)}
L(σ∗) = {t ∈ T : xt /∈ A(σ∗) and π∗t ({xt}) > 0}
C(σ∗) = {t ∈ T : xt /∈ A(σ∗) and π∗t (Mt(A(σ∗))) = 1}.
Thus, winning types find their ideal policy acceptable to a majority, and so implement
this policy in all periods. Compromising types are not so fortunate, but they still find
some acceptable policy as good as choosing their ideal policy and subsequently being
replaced, and they always choose such a policy. Finally, losing types have the opposite
preference, in that no acceptable policy is better than simply choosing their ideal policy
and subsequently being replaced, and a positive fraction of these types do choose the
latter option. In the next section, we show by way of a series of examples that any one of
these sets, or even two, may be empty in equilibrium.
This is of interest because the emptiness or non-emptiness of these sets largely deter-
mines the equilibrium dynamics of elections in our model. In particular, if L(σ∗) = ∅,
then all representatives choose policies in the social acceptance set. The first individual
to hold office is therefore re-elected, and, by history-independence, remains in office
forever, implementing the same policy in each period. We refer to this as perfect policy
persistence. On the other hand, if L(σ∗) = ∅, then the first representative and any newly
elected challenger will, with positive probability, choose a losing policy and be replaced in
the following period. As long as it is not the case that π∗t (A∗) = 0 for all types, however, a
representative will (with probability one) eventually be elected and choose a policy in the
social acceptance set, where again this policy remains in place forever. We call this even-
tual policy persistence. When it obtains, the long run distribution of policy outcomes puts
probability one on the social acceptance set, though the short run distribution may put
positive probability on policies outside the social acceptance set chosen by losing types.
EXAMPLES
Example 1 “All losers” equilibrium.
Let there be two dimensions, d = 2; let there be three types of individuals, |T | = 3, with
quadratic utilities, ut(x) = 1 − (‖xt − x‖)2, and ideal points at the vertices of a simplex,
‖xt − xt′‖ = 1 for all t, t′ ∈ T . Assume no office benefit, β = 0, and types are equally
represented in the population and in the pool of possible candidates, ρt = γt = 1/3 for
all t. Assuming all individuals propose their ideal policy and subsequently are replaced,
the continuation value for any individual is given by vt = (1/3)(1)+ (2/3)(0) = 1/3, i.e.,
in all periods there is a 1/3 chance of having their ideal policy being chosen, generating a
utility of 1, and a 2/3 chance of some other type’s ideal policy being chosen, generating
a utility of 0. What needs to be checked is that individuals in their role as representative
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prefer this losing strategy to compromising. For a type t individual, the closest point in
A∗ to xt is (1 − √2/3) away, because all individuals have continuation value equal to
1/3 and utility is quadratic. Thus, t can either lose and receive (1 − δ)(1) + δ(1/3), or
compromise and receive 1 − (1 − √2/3)2. Grinding through the algebra, we see that
losing is preferred as long as δ < (5/2) − 3√2/3 ≈ 0.05. Further, because losing is
strictly preferred, the equilibrium is unaffected if β is positive and small enough.
Example 2 “All compromisers” equilibrium.
Let the parameter values be the same as in Example 1, except for δ. Consider Figure 1,
from Baron’s (1991) model of spatial bargaining. Here the points a, c, and e are chosen
so that u1(c) = (u1(a) + u1(e))/2, with symmetric equalities holding for types 2 and 3.
We claim that the following constitutes an equilibrium for δ sufficiently large: all type 1
individuals select policy a and set u1 = u1(c), all type 2 individuals select policy c and set
u2 = u2(e), and all type 3 individuals select e and set u3 = u3(a). Given these cut-offs,
each type is optimizing conditional on choosing from A∗, and further, if individuals
adopt these policy strategies, then their cut-offs are indeed equal to their continuation
values. Thus, what remains to be checked is whether representatives are optimizing by
selecting from A∗, rather than choosing their ideal points. By symmetry, we need only
to check this condition for one type, say type 1. The relevant comparison is between
choosing p = a and remaining in office forever, and choosing p = x1 and being replaced
in the following period. The utility of the former is equal to u1(a), while the utility of
the latter is (1 − δ)(1) + δu1(c) = 1 − δ(1 − u1(c)). Thus, a type 1 individual prefers to
compromise whenever
u1(a) ≥ 1 − δ(1 − u1(c)),
Figure 1. “All compromisers” equilibrium.
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or equivalently,
δ ≥ 1 − u1(a)
1 − u1(c) .
Because 1 > u1(a) > u1(c) > 0, the right-hand side of the above expression lies in (0, 1),
and when δ is above this amount, we have an equilibrium.8
Example 3 “All winners” equilibrium.
Let there be two dimensions, d = 2; let there be fives types, |T | = 5, with highly risk
averse utilities, ut(x) = 16 − (‖xt − x‖)4. Arrange ideal points in a square with one
at the center, x1 = (1, 0), x2 = (0, 1), x3 = (−1, 0), x4 = (0,−1), x5 = (0, 0), and
note that the ideal point of type 5 is the core point. Again assume equal representation,
ρt = γt = 1/5 for all t. Assuming all individuals propose their ideal policy and have it
accepted, the continuation value for types 1–4 is given by vt = (1/5)(16) + (1/5)(15) +
(2/5)(12) + (1/5)(0) = 11, while the continuation value for a type 5 is v5 = (1/5)(16) +
(4/5)(15) = 15.8. Hence, type 5 individuals only vote to re-elect their own, and so an
individual of, e.g., type 1 must secure the votes of types 2 and 4 to be re-elected. Because
u2(x1) = u4(x1) = 12 > 11, type 2 and type 4 individuals indeed vote to re-elect type 1
representatives even when they propose their ideal policy. Similarly, types 2 and 4 vote to
re-elect type 3 representativeswhen they propose their ideal policy, and types 1 and 3 vote
to re-elect type 2 and type 4 representatives. Finally, p5 = x5 is acceptable to all types.
Because all individuals are implementing their ideal policywhen chosen as representative
and remaining as incumbent forever, the policy strategies are clearly optimal, and we
therefore have an equilibrium. A distinguishing feature of this strategy profile is that
it constitutes an equilibrium for every value of δ and β, regardless of time preferences
or non-policy benefits. We note in the next section that when β ≥ (1 − δ)/δ, there is a
second simple equilibrium in which all representative choose the core point (0, 0).
Example 4 “Mixed” equilibrium.
Let the policy space be an interval, X = [−1, 1]; let there be five types, |T | = 5, with
quadratic utilities, ut(x) = 4 − ‖x − xt‖2, and ideal points x1 = −1, x2 ∈ (−1, 0),
x3 = 0, x4 ∈ (0, 1), x5 = 1. Assume no office benefit, β = 0, and equal representation,
ρt = γt = 1/5 for all t. We construct an equilibrium in which type 1 and type 5
individuals lose, type 2 and type 4 individuals compromise at −c and c, respectively
(where c ∈ (0, 1)), and type 3 individuals win. With quadratic utilities and a single
dimension, one can show that type 3 individuals are decisive, in the sense that a proposal
will satisfy a majority if and only if it satisfies the median voter (see Banks and Duggan
8 Note that by the symmetry of the environment we actually have, as in Baron (1991), another
equilibrium where type 1’s select b, type 2’s select d and type 3’s select f , as well as an equilibrium
where half the type 1’s select a and the other half b, half the type 2’s c and the other half d, and half
the type 3’s e and the other half f .
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Figure 2. “Mixed” equilibrium.
2006, Lemma 2.1), so we only check this continuation value: v3 = [(2/5)(1 − δ)(3) +
(1/5)(4)+ (2/5)(4 − c2)]/(1− (2/5)δ). For a type 3 individual to be indifferent between
accepting and rejecting c, we set v3 equal to 4− c2. We find that the desired value for c is
c(δ) =
√
2 − 2δ
3 − 2δ .
Note that c(1) = 0, c(0) = √2/3, and c′ < 0. Because c(δ) is bounded away from 1,
there exists a positive δ, say δ+, for which type 1 and type 5 individuals prefer to lose
rather than compromise. Now set x2 slightly to the left of −c(δ+) and x4 slightly to the
right of c(δ+), so that type 2 and type 4 individuals prefer to compromise. See Figure 2.
The equilibria in Examples 2 and 3 exhibit perfect policy persistence, in that the first
representative remains as incumbent forever by choosing the same acceptable policy in
every period. In contrast, the equilibria inExample 4 exhibits eventual policy persistence:
only types 2, 3, and 4 choose acceptable policies, and so there will exist policy variability
until such a type is elected.
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Existence and Continuity
In this subsection, we address two fundamental theoretical issues: existence and continu-
ity properties of equilibria. While the main contribution of the paper are our results on
policy persistence and connections to the core, and implications for policy compromise
and incumbency advantage, these theoretical results inform us that our characterizations
are not vacuous or fragile.
Theorem 1 There exists a simple equilibrium.
A further desirable property of equilibria is uniqueness. Indeed, Duggan (2000)
establishes uniqueness in a one-dimensional version of themodel. ButExample 3 demon-
strates that there may bemultiple simple equilibria when the policy space is multidimen-
sional, so no general uniqueness result is available. In proving existence, we need to allow
for the possibility that individuals of the same type adopt different policies while in office
due to mixing. This comes about because, as seen in Example 2, the social acceptance set
A(σ) need not be convex, and so we may have a situation in which two distinct policies
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x, y ∈ A(σ) are optimal for type t individuals and yet no convex combination of x and y is
inA(σ). In addition, even ifA(σ) is convex, type t individuals may be indifferent between
choosing (optimally) from A(σ) and choosing xt /∈ A(σ), with no convex combination
giving as high a payoff. Allowing some type t individuals to choose one policy when in
office while others choose a different policy, and then having these proportions deter-
mined in equilibrium, effectively smooths out, or “convexifies,” representative behavior
from the perspective of the voters.
We next show that the set of equilibrium policies changes in a nice way as one varies
the underlying parameters of the model, which include the type distribution ρ, the
discount factor δ, the non-policy office benefit β, and the distribution γ of challenger
types. In addition, so that we may analyze the effect of varying voter preferences, we
parameterize utility functions by λ, which lies in a subset  ⊆ k of finite-dimensional
Euclidean space. Technically, we expand the domain of the utility function of a type t
to ut : X ×  → +, and we assume that each ut is jointly continuous in (x, λ), that
each ut(·, λ) is concave and strictly quasi-concave in x, and that ideal points are distinct
across types. As an example of such a parameterization, it could be that λ is a vector
(λ1, . . . , λ|T |) with each λt representing the ideal point of a quadratic utility function
for type t. For parameters ρ, δ, β, and γ , let E(ρ, δ,β, γ) denote the set of profiles of
simple equilibriumpolicy choice strategies. Our next result formalizes the idea that small
variations in (ρ, δ,β, γ) cannot lead the set E(ρ, δ,β, γ) of simple equilibria to expand
discontinuously.9
Theorem 2 The correspondence E of simple equilibria is upper hemicontinuous in the
parameters of the model.
One of the important consequences of Theorem 2 is the following. If we can solve for
all of the equilibria at some particular parameter values, then we know that for values
suitably close to this, all equilibria will be close (in the sense of weak convergence) to
the original set: though policies far from this set may occur with positive probability,
that probability must go to zero as we approach the original parameter values of the
model. Hence, when we fully characterize the equilibria in specific situations, we can be
confident that these results are not “knife-edge” and that they provide an upper bound
for the equilibria in that region of the parameter space.
Policy Persistence
We now analyze the dynamics of simple equilibria. Our focus is on the likelihood that
some or all types choose losing policies, for it is this aspect of equilibrium strategies
9 A correspondence  : X ⇒ Y is upper hemicontinuous if given each point x in the domain and
each open set G containing (x), the set inclusion (x) ⊆ G is maintained by arbitrarily small
perturbations of x. See the Appendix for a formal definition for the equilibrium correspondence E.
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that determines the persistence of policies over time.10 The first result of this subsection
shows that if either voters are sufficiently patient (and β > 0) or the non-policy benefits
from office are sufficiently large (and δ > 0), then all types are winners or compromisers.
In that case, we have perfect policy persistence, i.e., the first representative remains as
incumbent forever by choosing the same policy in every period, and a strong incumbency
advantage.Our analysis also identifies aweaker constraint on our parameters underwhich
not all types are losers, implying eventual policy persistence, i.e., a type of representative
who selects a policy from A∗ and implements it in all remaining periods is eventually
chosen.The last result of the subsection is that evenwhennon-policy benefits of office are
zero, sufficiently high δ implies perfect policy persistence, unless the core is non-empty—
and in that case, the social acceptance set, and therefore the long run distribution of
policies, must collapse to the core.
As argued earlier, in any simple equilibrium σ∗, we must have ut(x(σ∗)) ≥ vt(σ∗) for
all t ∈ T , and because x(σ∗) ∈ A∗, it follows that uˆt(σ∗) ≡ max{ut(x) : x ∈ A∗} satisfies
uˆt(σ∗) ≥ vt(σ∗). A type t incumbent will prefer to compromise whenever
uˆt(σ∗) + β > (1 − δ)[ut(xt) + β] + δvt(σ∗).
For every δ < 1, the first term on the left-hand side is strictly greater than the last
term on the right-hand side (recall utilities are non-negative), and therefore, if β ≥
(1 − δ)[ut(xt) + β], then it must be that t is not a losing type, i.e., t /∈ L(σ∗). Rewriting
this inequality,
ut(xt) ≤ βδ1 − δ .
Now define
α = max{ut(xt) : t ∈ T} and α = min{ut(xt) : t ∈ T},
which are well-defined and positive, because each ut(xt) is strictly positive andT is finite.
The next result is an immediate consequence of the foregoing observations.
Theorem 3 Let σ∗ be a simple equilibrium. (i) If βδ/(1 − δ) ≥ α, then L(σ∗) = ∅ in
every simple equilibrium σ∗. (ii) If βδ/(1 − δ) ≥ α then T\L(σ∗) = ∅ in every simple
equilibrium σ∗.
Theorem 3 has two important implications. First, (i) implies that for every positive
level β > 0 of office benefit, there exists a level δ ∈ [0, 1) of patience such that, when
δ ≥ δ, all simple equilibria exhibit perfect policy persistence. And for every δ > 0, there
10 We are grateful to a referee for the observation that policy persistence in our model can be viewed
as a form of gridlock arising from a representative’s incentives for re-election, rather than from
conflict of interest among representatives from different parties. SeeKrehbiel (1998) for an in-depth
discussion of partisan gridlock.
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existsβ > 0 such that whenβ ≥ β, every equilibrium exhibits perfect policy persistence.
Second, using (ii), we can get lower bounds than these, at the cost of replacing “perfect”
with “eventual.” That the result of Theorem 3 does not hold for arbitrary parameter
values follows from Example 1, which shows the possibility of “all losers” in multiple
dimensions when δ and β are both sufficiently small.
Because α is positive, the above result is silent when either β or δ (or both) are equal to
zero. Indeed, it is clear that when δ equals zero, representatives will simply choose their
ideal policy while in office regardless of the value of β, implying that in certain situations
(e.g., Example 1), no representative is ever re-elected. Hence, eventual policy persistence
fails to hold. On the other hand, even when β equals zero, the next result shows that for
sufficiently high values of δ, eventual policy persistence must hold in every equilibrium
(e.g., Example 2).
Theorem 4 Let σ∗ be a simple equilibrium with social acceptance set A∗. There exists
δ ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ ∈ [δ, 1), then π∗t (A∗) > 0 for some t ∈ T.
Theorems 3 and 4 give us two results on the properties of simple equilibria as the
discount factor δ approaches one: perfect policy persistence must occur if β is positive,
and eventual policy persistence must occur even if β is zero. The final result of this
subsection completes the analysis. We show that in any environment where β = 0
and where high δ does not imply perfect policy persistence, the core must be non-
empty. Further, in the absence of perfect policy persistence, the social acceptance sets
must converge to the core point, xc. Convergence here is with respect to the Hausdorff
metric (see Aliprantis and Border 1994), which for our purposes can be simplified to
the following: for any compact set Y ⊆ X and element x ∈ X , define the Hausdorff
distance between Y and x as h(Y , x) = max{‖y − x‖ : y ∈ Y }. Then a sequence {Yk}
of compact sets is said to “converge to x” if the sequence {h(Yk, x)} converges to zero.
Theorem 5 Let {δk} converge to one, and let {σk} be a corresponding sequence of simple
equilibria, with social acceptance sets {Ak}. If mint∈T πkt (Ak) < 1 for all k, then the core is
non-empty, and {Ak} converges to xc.
Thus, greater patience leads to perfect policy persistence, except under rather specific
conditions.When the core is empty, the typical case inmultiple dimensions, perfect policy
persistence necessarily obtains for discount factors close enough to one. When the core
is non-empty, perfect policy persistence may not obtain: for discount factors arbitrarily
close to one, there may be equilibria in which some types choose their ideal points and
fail to be re-elected. In this case, however, the social acceptance sets corresponding to
these equilibria, and the long run distribution of policies, must converge to the core.
Core Equivalence
It can be shown quite generally (Banks and Duggan 2008) that if the core is non-empty,
then there is some type of representative that chooses the core policy and is continually re-
elected. Thus, the long run distribution of policy outcomes puts positive probability on
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the core point. As in Example 3, however, there may be other policy outcomes that occur
with positive probability in the long run. In this subsection, we investigate the conditions
under which the core point is the only policy selected in equilibrium, i.e.,πt({xc}) = 1 for
all t ∈ T , a phenomenon we call “core equivalence.” Note the implication, in particular,
that all representatives must choose the same policy, which we call “policy coincidence.”
Our first result shows that policy coincidence, while conceptually weaker, is actually
equivalent to core equivalence in equilibrium, and it gives a necessary and sufficient
condition for policy coincidence to hold. Going to one dimension, we then show that,
assuming sufficient patience or non-policy benefits of office (with δ > 0 and β > 0), core
equivalence obtains in every simple equilibrium, giving a strong version of the median
voter theorem for repeated elections. Finally, when non-policy benefits are zero, we prove
an asymptotic median voter result for patient electorates.
Suppose that in a simple strategy profile σ, all representatives choose the same policy,
say, πt({xˆ}) = 1 for all t ∈ T . In this case, vt(σ) is simply equal to ut(xˆ), and so
individuals always vote to retain the incumbent and unanimity prevails. Clearly, it cannot
be an equilibrium for all individuals to adopt a common policy xˆ other than the core
point: there would then be a policy y and a decisive coalition C of types such that
ut(y) > ut(xˆ) = vt(σ∗) for all t ∈ C, and, hence, any time a member of C is elected, she
would not select xˆ as her policy. Conversely, if xˆ = xc, then we may have an equilibrium,
depending on the values of δ andβ. Because xc is the unique core point and vt(σ) = ut(xc),
it follows from external stability that A∗ = {xc}, and, therefore, we need only to check
whether representatives prefer compromising at xc to choosing their ideal points. If
ut(xc) + β ≥ (1 − δ)(ut(xt) + β) + δut(xc) (1)
for all t ∈ T , then π∗t ({xc}) = 1 for all t ∈ T is an equilibrium. If this inequality fails to
hold for some t ∈ T , then this is not an equilibrium. Re-arranging (1), we have
δβ
1 − δ ≥ ut(xt) − ut(x
c).
Define
αc = max{ut(xt) − ut(xc) : t ∈ T},
and note that, because xt = xt′ for all t, t′ ∈ T , we have αc > 0. Note also that αc is only
defined when xc exists, whereas α and α are always defined. Because ut(xc) ≥ 0 for all
t ∈ T , it must be that αc ≤ α when the core is non-empty. Thus, we have proved the
following result.
Theorem 6 There is a simple equilibrium σ∗ such that π∗t ({xˆ}) = 1 for all t ∈ T if and
only if the core is non-empty, xˆ = xc, and δβ/(1 − δ) ≥ αc.
As an application, return to Example 3, and note that xc exists and is at the origin.
For all t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we have ut(xt) − ut(xc) = 16 − 15 = 1, and because x5 = xc,
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this difference for t = 5 is zero. Thus, αc = 1. By Theorem 6, therefore, whenever
β ≥ (1 − δ)/δ, we will have a second equilibrium in which all representatives select the
core point (0, 0). A further consequence of Theorem 6 is that if non-policy benefits of
holding office are zero or if the core is empty, then policy coincidence cannot occur in
equilibrium. Because the core is generically empty in two or more dimensions, we have
a negative result for policy coincidence in multiple dimensions. Of course, the core is
non-empty and equal to the ideal point of the weighted median type whenever the policy
space is one-dimensional, and Theorem 6 yields the following.
Corollary 1 Assume d = 1. There is a simple equilibrium σ∗ such that π∗t ({xm}) = 1 for
all t ∈ T if and only if δβ/(1 − δ) ≥ αc.
Henceforth, we focus on the one-dimensional setting, d = 1. From Corollary 1, it
follows that as long as the individuals are sufficiently patient and non-policy benefits are
sufficiently high, we can support the Downsian prediction of convergence to the median
in at least one simple equilibrium of the one-dimensional model. In that case, clearly
all types but the median compromise, and the first representative chosen remains as
incumbent forever, continually implementing xm. We next take up the issue of when core
equivalence obtains in all simple equilibria. Example 3 shows that inmultiple dimensions,
other equilibria may exist for all β and δ, but we will show that a strengthening of the
condition in Corollary 1 is sufficient for a unique equilibrium outcome at the core in
one dimension. As a step in that direction, the next lemma shows that in one dimension,
we can partition the set of equilibria into two distinct classes: either all representatives
choose the median, or else some representatives do not compromise at all. Thus, in one
dimension, perfect policy persistence implies core equivalence.
Lemma 1 Assume d = 1, and let σ∗ be a simple equilibrium. If L(σ∗) = ∅, then
π∗t ({xm}) = 1 for all t ∈ T.
We can now state our sufficient condition, a direct consequence of Theorem 3 and
Lemma 1, for core equivalence in every simple equilibrium. It delivers a median voter
result based not on competition between candidates, as in theDownsianmodel, but on the
expectations of voters and the incentives of representatives in a dynamic electoral model
with asymmetric information. The prominence of the median is sustained even with
privately informed politicians’ and in the absence of commitment to policy platforms.
Theorem 7 Assume d = 1. If δβ/(1 − δ) ≥ α, then there is a unique simple equilibrium,
and in equilibrium, π∗t ({xm}) = 1 for all t ∈ T.
In sum, Corollary 1 shows that policy coincidence at the core constitutes an equilib-
rium in one dimension when δβ/(1 − δ) ≥ αc, and Theorem 7 establishes that policy
coincidence at the core constitutes the equilibrium when δ and β satisfy the stronger
restriction that δβ/(1 − δ) ≥ α. An implication of Theorem 7 is that when β > 0, the
social acceptance set A∗ will be equal to the median voter’s ideal point xm when the elec-
torate is sufficiently patient. In the stylized case of β = 0, however, no such conclusion
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can be drawn: results in Banks andDuggan (2008) imply that the equilibrium acceptance
set A∗ is always a strict superset of xm when β = 0. Our final result closes this issue
by showing that an asymptotic version of the median voter theorem obtains even in the
absence of any exogenous benefit from holding office.
Theorem 8 Assume d = 1. Let {δk}∞k=1 converge to 1, and let {σk} be a corresponding
sequence of simple equilibria, with social acceptance set Ak. Then {Ak} converges to xm.
Even when there are no non-policy benefits from holding office, and so policies other
than the median may be sufficient to ensure re-election of the incumbent, the social
acceptance set A∗ does indeed converge to the weighted median xm as δ approaches
one, and the long run distribution of policies will, therefore, be close to the weighted
median. The results of this section are illustrated in a numerical example in Duggan
(2000). There, it is shown for particular parametric specifications that when office benefit
is positive, all types of representative compromise at the median ideal point when δ is
sufficiently large; when office benefit is zero, such perfect compromise is not achieved,
but appears to be met in the limit. Our results inform us that these patterns are indeed
regularities, which hold for completely general specifications of the one-dimensional
model.
EXTENSIONS
The analysis of our model would be complicated, but our results largely unaffected, by
any of several generalizations and extensions. First, Theorems 1–4, on existence and
policy persistence, would continue to hold for arbitrary voting rules, such as a quota rule
or even an arbitrary collection, say D, of decisive coalitions of types. This would change
the definition of A(σ) slightly without changing its fundamental continuity properties.
Our other results would continue to hold as long as the voting rule were strong in the
sense defined in section “Electoral Model”. This extension is perhaps uninteresting in a
model of representative democracy, the main focus of our paper, but it permits a much
broader interpretation of the model that captures dictatorial political systems in which
the current dictator must maintain the support of a winning coalition of political elite
in order to stay in power.11 Assuming private information about preferences, the logic
of our model extends in a straightforward way: the dictator faces a tradeoff between
choosing a personally favorable outcome, possibly losing the support of the elite, or
choosing a policy at least as good for a decisive coalition as a draw from the pool of
potential dictators. Here, the benefit from holding office, β, can incorporate punishment
of dictators who are removed from office (in which case, β is high).
Second, though Example 3 shows that core equivalence need not obtain in multiple
dimensions (even when a core point exists and δ and β are arbitrarily high), our core
equivalence results do extend to multiple dimensions for a restricted class of preferences,
11 We are grateful to Ken Shotts for pointing out this interpretation of the model.
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namely, when utility functions are quadratic: ut(x) = kt − ||x− xt||2. Using Lemma 2.1
of Banks and Duggan (2006), we can show that the core type, if one exists, is decisive
in equilibrium, in the following sense: a policy is socially acceptable if and only if it is
acceptable to the core voter type. With this result, and the assumption that the core is
nonempty, we can prove results exactly analogous toLemma 1 andTheorem7.Of course,
the core is generically empty in multiple dimensions, so the interest in this version of
our core equivalence result is limited. But, from Theorem 2, we know that, when the
core is “close” to nonempty, equilibrium policies will be “close” (in the sense of weak
convergence) to being in the core. See our working paper (Banks and Duggan 2008) for
these results and an extended example.
Third, our results would hold if we added an exogenous and time-invariant positive
probability of an incumbent being removed from office (through death, impeachment,
etc.), though the results on policy persistence would obviously have to be re-interpreted
in terms of expected duration of tenure in office. In such a model, even winners and
compromisers, through no fault of their own, would eventually be replaced, generating
richer dynamics for the model. The current formulation, which admittedly leads to very
stark dynamics, was chosen for its simplicity and because the possibility of turnover does
not essentially change ourmessage about voter patience and non-policy benefits of office.
Finally, all of our results would hold in a version of the model with a finite number
of voters and a separate, countably infinite pool of potential challengers (who do not
vote) with types identically and independently distributed according to γ . Suppose a
new challenger is drawn in every period to run against the incumbent. The continuation
values of voters and representatives would be unchanged: what is essential is that no voter
perceives a chance that she will be drawn as a challenger, and no representative perceives
a chance that she will be re-drawn as a challenger after losing an election. The main
advantage of this reformulation, aside from avoiding some technical complexities that
arise in a model with a continuum of players, is that voters are now conceivably pivotal in
elections, so that our equilibrium condition on voting strategies can be justified directly
in terms of weak dominance. The obvious disadvantage is that we must treat voters as
essentially different from candidates (who cannot vote). Our philosophical preference,
given this trade-off, is to model candidates exactly as voters.
CONCLUSION
Our objective in this paper has been to improve our general understanding of electoral
processes, with particular interest in their dynamic and informational aspects. Thus, we
have proposed a model of repeated elections in which politicians determine policies in
a multidimensional issue space and in which preferences are private information. Our
framework captures the strategic incentives of politicians, whose private preferences
and concern for re-election confronts them with a trade-off in choosing policies, and it
captures the strategic calculus of voters, who must anticipate the future policy choices
of incumbent politicians and challengers. We have focused on foundational issues, such
as the existence of equilibria, the stability of policies over time, and the relationship
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between equilibrium policies and the core. As a byproduct of our equilibrium anal-
ysis, we have shown that concern for reputation, combined with an infinite horizon,
can lead to endogenous compromise by elected representatives, even without the con-
straints of previous commitments. Further, due to the informational asymmetry between
untried challengers and incumbents, a strong form of incumbency advantage can arise
in equilibrium. Finally, we have proved a version of the median voter theorem for the
one-dimensional model, showing that the long run equilibrium policies of the model
collapse to the median voter’s ideal point as voters become patient.
APPENDIX
Theorem 1 There exists a simple equilibrium.
Proof: We first prove existence of an equilibrium in a modified version of the above
game, and we then argue that any equilibrium of the modified game corresponds to an
equilibrium in the original game. Augment the set of options available to a representative
to include a “shirk” option, s, interpreted as choosing her ideal point and then sitting
out the next election. If the current incumbent uses the shirk option, therefore, the
voters must choose the challenger in the next period. We focus on equilibria in which a
representative chooses the shirk option whenever her optimal choice would lose the next
election, i.e., if a representative would choose her ideal point and that policy is not in
the social acceptance set, then she chooses to shirk. These equilibria are distinguished
from others in that representatives foresee the result of choosing xt /∈ A∗, taking the
initiative by choosing s and declining to run, instead of choosing xt and forcing voters to
replace them.
A policy strategy for type t individuals is now a Borel probability measure π˜t on
X˜ = X ∪ {s}.12 Given a profile π˜ = (π˜1, . . . , π˜|T |), and assuming that all future
representatives who do not shirk are re-elected, the continuation value of electing a
challenger for a type t voter can be expressed as a function of π˜ only:
vt(π˜) =
∑
t′∈T
γt′
[
π˜t′ ({s})[(1 − δ)ut(xt′ ) + δvt(π˜)] +
∫
X
ut(x)π˜t′ (dx)
]
,
implying
vt(π˜) =
∑
t′∈T γt′
[
π˜t′ ({s})(1 − δ)ut(xt′ ) +
∫
X ut(x)π˜t′ (dx)
]
1 − δ∑t′∈T γt′ π˜t′ ({s}) .
Note that vt is a continuous function of π˜ with the topology of weak convergence on
P(X˜), the Borel probabilitymeasures on X˜ .We look for an equilibrium in terms of policy
strategies only, because individuals vote for the incumbent if and only if the continuation
12 We define Y˜ ⊆ X˜ to be open if Y ⊆ Y˜ ⊆ Y ∪ {s} for some open Y ⊆ X .
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value of the incumbent is at least that of a challenger. That is, a type t individual votes
to re-elect if and only if the incumbent chose a policy in the set
At(π˜) = {x ∈ X : ut(x) ≥ vt(π˜)}.
For each t ∈ T , the set At(π˜) is non-empty, compact, and convex by the continuity and
concavity of ut . If π˜t({s}) < 1, then let
y(π˜t) =
∫
X xπ˜t(dx)
1 − π˜t({s})
denote the expected outcome associated with a type t incumbent conditional on the
incumbent not shirking. If π˜t({s}) = 1, then let y(π˜t) be defined arbitrarily. By the
concavity of ut , the policy
x(π˜) =
∑
t′∈T γt′ [π˜t′ ({s})(1 − δ)xt′ + (1 − π˜t′ ({s}))y(π˜t′ )]
1 − δ∑t′∈T γt′ π˜t′ ({s})
therefore satisfies ut(x(π˜)) ≥ vt(π˜), and hence x(π˜) ∈ At(π˜), for all t. As in section
“Simple Equilibria,” for all C ∈ D, define AC(π˜) = ⋂t∈C At(π˜), also non-empty,
compact, and convex. And define A(π˜) = ⋃C∈D AC(π˜), non-empty and compact but
not necessarily convex. By arguments in the appendix of Banks and Duggan (2000), it
follows thatA( ·) is a continuous correspondence on [P(X˜)]T , the set of profiles of policy
choice strategies over X˜ .
Given π˜, an incumbent chooses a policy or shirks so as to maximize her discounted
expected payoff. Thus, define Ut(· ; π˜) : X˜ →  by
Ut(x; π˜) =
{
(1 − δ)[ut(xt) + β] + δvt(π˜) if x = s,
ut(x) + β otherwise,
and note that Ut is jointly continuous in (x, π˜). Let
Mt(π˜) ≡ arg max{Ut(x; π˜) : x ∈ A(π˜) ∪ {s}}.
BecauseA( · )∪{s} is a continuous correspondence, theMaximumTheorem implies that
the correspondence Mt : [P(X˜)]T ⇒ X˜ has non-empty and compact values, and it is
upper hemicontinuous. It is not necessarily convex-valued, however, because A(π˜) ∪ {s}
is not convex. Let Bt(π˜) = P(Mt(π˜)) denote the set of probability measures over opti-
mal choices, which defines a non-empty, compact-, and convex-valued correspondence.
Moreover, by Aliprantis and Border’s (1994) Theorem 14.14, Bt is upper hemicontinu-
ous. Define the correspondence B : [P(X˜)]T ⇒ [P(X˜)]T by
B(π˜) = B1(π˜) × B2(π˜) × · · · × B|T |(π˜),
which inherits these properties. Because [P(X˜)]T is compact and convex, Glicksberg’s
(1952) theorem yields a fixed point of B, say π˜∗ = (π˜∗1 , . . . , π˜∗|T |). Then π˜∗, together
with cut-off rules
u∗t = vt(π˜∗), t = 1, . . . , |T |,
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constitutes an equilibrium of the augmented game in which individuals either shirk or
are re-elected. Finally, it is easy to see how equilibria in the augmented game translate
into equilibria of the original game: for all t ∈ T and for all measurable Y ⊆ X , set
π∗t (Y ) = π˜∗t ({s})µxt (Y ) + π˜∗t (Y ),
where µxt is the point mass on xt . 
Let  denote the unit simplex in |T |, and define
◦ =
{
ρ ∈  : ∀ C ⊆ T ,
∑
t∈C
ρt = 1/2
}
.
Then define the correspondence E : ◦ × [0, 1) × + ×  ×  ⇒ [P(X)]T such
that E(ρ, δ,β, γ , λ) consists of the profiles of simple equilibrium policy choice strategies
for model parameters (ρ, δ,β, γ , λ). We say that E is upper hemicontinuous if, for every
(ρ, δ,β, γ , λ) in this space and for every open set Y ⊆ [P(X)]T with E(ρ, δ,β, γ , λ) ⊆
Y , there exists an open set Z ⊆ ◦ × [0, 1)×+ ×× with (ρ, δ,β, γ , λ) ∈ Z such
that, for all (ρ′, δ′,β′, γ ′, λ′) ∈ Z, E(ρ′, δ′,β′, γ ′, λ′) ⊆ Y .
Theorem 2 The correspondence E of simple equilibria is upper hemicontinuous in the param-
eters of the model.
Proof: Wefirst consider the augmented game defined in the proof of Theorem 1.Given
parameters (ρ, δ,β, γ , λ), with ρ ∈ ◦, and strategy profile π˜ = (π˜1, . . . , π˜|T |), let θ
denote the vector (ρ, δ,β, γ , λ, π˜), and define
At(θ) = {x ∈ X : ut(x, λ) ≥ vt(π˜, ρ, δ, λ)},
where vt is a type t individual’s continuation value as defined above but using ut(·, λ).
By arguments in the appendix of Banks and Duggan (2000), it follows that
A(θ) ≡
⋃
C∈D(ρ)
[⋂
t∈C
At(θ)
]
is continuous as a correspondence at θ, where the collection D(ρ) of decisive coalitions
of types generated by ρ is constant on an open set containing ρ, because ρ ∈ ◦. Define
Ut(·; θ) : X˜ →  by
Ut(x; θ) =
{
(1 − δ)[ut(x, λ) + β] + δvt(π˜, ρ, δ, λ) if x = s,
ut(x, λ) + β otherwise.
Because Ut(x; θ) is continuous in (x, θ), the Maximum Theorem implies that
Mt(θ) ≡ arg max{Ut(x; θ) : x ∈ A(θ) ∪ {s}}
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is upper hemicontinuous at θ, and therefore so is Bt(θ) ≡ P(Mt(θ)). Because Bt has
closed values and regular range as well, it has closed graph at θ (Aliprantis and Border
1994, Theorem 14.17). Now let (ρm, δm,βm, γm, λm) → (ρ, δ,β, γ , λ) ∈ ◦ × [0, 1) ×
+ ×  × , take any sequence {πm} of policy choice profiles in the original game
such that πm ∈ E(ρm, δm,βm, γm, λm) for all m, and suppose πm → π. Transform these
into policy choice profiles, {π˜m} and π˜, in the augmented game in the obvious manner,
e.g., if xt /∈ A(πm), then define π˜mt ({s}) = πmt ({xt}). Thus, π˜mt ∈ Bt(θm) for all m and
π˜m → π˜ weakly. Because Bt has closed graph at θ, we have π˜t ∈ Bt(θ) for all t ∈ T .
Therefore, π ∈ E(ρ, δ,β, γ , λ), and we conclude that E has closed graph. Because it
has compact Hausdorff range as well, it is upper hemicontinuous (Aliprantis and Border
1994, Theorem 14.12). 
Theorem 4 Let σ∗ be a simple equilibrium with social acceptance set A∗. There exists
δ ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ ∈ [δ, 1), then π∗t (A∗) > 0 for some t ∈ T.
Proof: The case β > 0 is covered by Theorem 3. Assume β = 0, and suppose that
we can find a sequence {δk} with δk → 1 and a corresponding sequence {σk} of simple
equilibria with acceptance sets {Ak} such that πkt (Ak) = 0 for all t ∈ T and all k. Hence,
given any k, each type of officeholder chooses her ideal point and fails to gain re-election,
and so vt(σk) is simply
∑
t′∈T γt′ut(xt′ ), which is independent of k. Denote this amount
vˆt . Thus, the equilibrium social acceptance sets, Ak, are also independent of k, which
implies max{ut(x) : x ∈ Ak} is independent of k. Denote this amount uˆt . Because ideal
points are distinct, utilities are strictly concave, and γt′ > 0 for all t′ ∈ T , we have
uˆt > vˆt . Therefore, for all t ∈ T and for k high enough, we have
uˆt > (1 − δk)ut(xt) + δkvˆt .
But then the optimal policy choice for type t representatives is to compromise by choosing
a point in Ak, a contradiction. 
Theorem 5 Let {δk} converge to one, and let {σk} be a corresponding sequence of simple
equilibria, with social acceptance sets {Ak}. If mint∈T πkt (Ak) < 1 for all k, then the core is
non-empty, and {Ak} converges to xc.
Proof: Take any sequence {σk} of simple equilibria such that mint∈T πkt (Ak) < 1 for
all k. We first show that the core is non-empty. From Theorem 3, we know that β must
equal zero. And because T is finite, there must exist a type t′ ∈ T and a subsequence
(also indexed by k) such that πkt′ (A
k) < 1 for all k. It follows that representatives of type
t′ are willing to shirk for all k:
(1 − δk)ut′ (xt′ ) + δkvt′ (σk) ≥ uˆkt′ ,
where uˆkt′ = max{ut′ (x) : x ∈ Ak}. Because {vt′ (σk)} and {uˆkt′ } lie in compact sets, we
may go to a subsequence (also indexed by k) along which these sequences converge. It
follows that
lim vt′ (σk) ≥ lim uˆkt′ . (A.1)
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Because uˆkt′ ≥ vt′ (σk) for all k, (A.1) actually holds with equality. Now let ψk be the
distribution on X associated with the kth equilibrium, so that
vt′ (σk) =
∫
ut′ (x)ψk(dx)
for all k. BecauseX is compact, {ψk} has a subsequence (also indexed by k) that converges
weakly to some probability measure ψ on X . By weak convergence,
lim vt′ (σk) =
∫
ut′ (x)ψ(dx). (A.2)
Let
x(ψk) =
∫
xψk(dx) and x(ψ) =
∫
xψ(dx),
and note that x(ψk) ∈ Ak for all k by concavity of voter utility functions. Hence,
uˆkt′ ≥ ut′ (x(ψk)) (A.3)
for all k. Using x(ψk) → x(ψ) and the continuity of ut′ , (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) yield∫
ut′ (x)ψ(dx) = lim vt′ (σk) ≥ lim uˆkt′ ≥ lim ut′ (x(ψk)) = ut′ (x(ψ)).
From strict quasi-concavity, we conclude that ψ is concentrated on some point xˆ, i.e.,
ψ({xˆ}) = 1. We claim that xˆ is a core point, i.e., xˆ = xc. If not, then there exist y ∈ X
and C ∈ D such that, for all t ∈ C, ut(y) > ut(xˆ). Because
lim vt(σk) =
∫
ut(x)ψ(dx) = ut(xˆ),
we have y ∈ Ak for high enough k. Also, we have
ut(y) > (1 − δk)ut(xt) + δkvt(σk)
for all t ∈ C when k is high enough. This is implies that, for all t ∈ C,πkt (Ak) = 1when k
is high enough. LetY ⊆ X be any open set such that xˆ ∈ Y and for all t ∈ C and all z ∈
Y , ut(y) > ut(z). For each t ∈ C, clearlyπkt (Ak) = 1 impliesπkt (Ak\Y ) = 1.But thenψk
does not converge weakly to the point mass at xˆ, contradicting the above result. We now
show that {Ak} converges to the core. If not, then there is an open setY with xc ∈ Y and a
subsequence (also indexed by k) {xk} such that, for all k, xk ∈ Ak∩(X\Y ). BecauseX\Y
is compact, there is a subsequence (also indexed by k) and a policy x˜ ∈ X\Y such that
xk → x˜. BecauseD is finite, wemay suppose (going to a subsequence if necessary) there is
some C ∈ D such that, for all k, xk ∈ AC(σk). Thus, for all t ∈ C, ut(xk) ≥ vt(σk). Now,
by our first argument,wemay choose a subsequence (also indexed by k) with continuation
distributions {ψk} converging to the pointmass on xc, and, therefore, vt(σk) → ut(xc) for
all t ∈ T . Then, by continuity, we have ut(x˜) ≥ ut(xc) for all t ∈ C. But then strict quasi-
concavity implies ut((1/2)x˜+ (1/2)xc) > ut(xc) for all t ∈ C, a contradiction. Therefore,
Ak → {xc}. 
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Lemma 1 Assume d = 1, and let σ∗ be a simple equilibrium. If L(σ∗) = ∅, then
π∗t ({xm}) = 1 for all t ∈ T.
Proof: Suppose L(σ∗) = ∅, i.e., all types propose policies in A∗ and, hence, are re-
elected. Let S(σ∗) denote the support of the policy strategies in σ∗, i.e., the smallest
closed subset of X with probability one under πt for all t ∈ T , and define
p = min≥ S(σ
∗) and p = max≥ S(σ
∗).
If p = p, i.e., S(σ∗) = 1, then we know from Theorem 6 that S(σ∗) = {xm}, and so
it must be that π∗t ({xm}) = 1 for all t ∈ T . If p < p, i.e., S(σ∗) > 1, then by strict
quasi-concavity of ut , we have
arg min{ut(x) : x ∈ S(σ∗)} ⊆ {p, p}
for all t ∈ T . Define T ⊆ T as those types for which this minimizer is unique and equal
to p, T ⊆ T as the types for which this is unique and equal to p, and I ⊆ T as the types
for which ut(p) = ut(p). Because x(σ∗) ∈ A∗, we have
max{ut(x) : x ∈ S(σ∗)} ≥ vt(σ∗) ≥ min{ut(x) : x ∈ S(σ∗)} (A.4)
for all t ∈ T . By strict quasi-concavity and our assumption that γt′ > 0 for all t′ ∈ T ,
we then have ut(x(σ∗)) > vt(σ∗), and because x(σ∗) ∈ A(σ∗), this implies
max{ut(x) : x ∈ A(σ∗)} > vt(σ∗)
for all t ∈ T . And this, with γt > 0, implies that both of the inequalities are strict in
(A.4) for all t ∈ T . In particular, vt(σ∗) > ut(p) = ut(p) for all t ∈ I . Therefore, all t ∈ I
vote against incumbents choosing policies p and p, and so the only types voting in favor
of the policy p are those in T , and the only types voting in favor of p are those in T . Each
of these policies is accepted, so it must be that T ∈ D and T ∈ D, i.e.,∑t∈T ρt > 1/2
and
∑
t∈T ρt > 1/2. However, T ∩ T = ∅, a contradiction. 
Theorem 8 Assume d = 1. Let {δk}∞k=1 converge to 1, and let {σk} be a corresponding
sequence of simple equilibria, with social acceptance set Ak. Then {Ak} converges to xm.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a subsequence of {Ak} (also indexed by k) and some
ε > 0 such that for all k, d(Ak, {xc}) ≥ ε. It follows from Theorem 7 that β = 0, and
Lemma 1 then implies that L(σk) = ∅ for all k. By Theorem 5, we have Ak → {xc}, a
contradiction. 
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